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THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
IN THE WORLD COMMUNITY
John H. Spencer
In effect, I am being offered to your
salivating fangs as a proponent of what
some have labeled a big, blooming,
buzzing confusion-international law.
I'm reminded that the philosopher
Hobbes had told us that man is the only
beast that preys on its own kind. Now,
this morning, in order to present the
narrowest possible target to your combined attacks-80 percent of the world's
fighting power is represented here this
morning in the persons of the U.S.
Armed Forces and those 31 friendly
nations-I wish to define the terms used
in the topic for today's lecture which is
"The Role of International Law in the
World Community."
I do so because it is important in this
introductory lecture to the course on
international law that we proceed
directly to the ultimate fundamentals.
Let me, therefore, tum first to the two
words "world community" and suggest
to you that as a lawyer for whom
international law has long been a source
of livelihood, I have some doubts
whether one can profitably use this
term "world community." The political
scientist, the economist, the sociologist
-all can accept this expression with
greater ease than can the lawyer who
must compete in a world of adversaries.
I would propose that for today we
substitute for this phrase the words
"world arena." The expression "world
community" implies a plurality of states

and nations drawn by common interests
into collaborative and structural relationships to each other promoted by
international organizations. In fact,
reality is much closer to a scenario in
which highly autonomous and competitive states seek aggressively to advance
and defensively to protect what each
deems to be its national objectives
through reciprocity rather than communion of interests. In this arena the
actors are states, with international organizations largely reduced to the role
of disapproving spectators.
Let me go into this matter a little
more thoroughly, yet briefly, I hope. I
suggest that if we look at the United
Nations, a moment's reflection would
reveal that the General Assembly can
take no decisions in this world scenario
apart from internal housekeeping
arrangements. It can make only recommendations. You will recall that
recently Israel was severely reproved at
the General Assembly for declaring that
she would refuse to recognize the resolutions on Jerusalem voted in June of
this year. But the criticism emerged
precisely from those states that 20 years
ago had adopted exactly the same position declaring that they utterly rejected
the United Nations resolutions relating
to the admission of Israel. The U.S.S.R.
has adopted a similar attitude on other
questions as had indeed, on occasion,
the United States itself.
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Now, with regard to the Security
Council you are aware of the veto
power, and certainly the United States
is bound by nothing in substance at the
Security Council which we do not wish
to be bound by.
You may say, "Let us leave this
problem aside; is it not a fact that the
United Nations operates as a world
community? How about these U.N.
Forces in the Congo, Cyprus, Yemen, et
cctcra?" However, if we look at the
present structure of the United Nations
we can see that here the contributions
are on a state-to-state basis. The U.N.
operations in Yemen and Cyprus are
supported not by the United Nations
but individually and voluntarily only by
those states which choose to participate.
"Well," you may say, "how about
the International Court of Justice?" I
would suggest that the same conclusion
obtains. No state may be bound 01.'
hauled before it without its consent.
Now it is true that under article 36 of
the Statute of the Court the United
States has recognized the so-called compulsory jurisdiction of that tribunal. But
it is also true that we have adopted what
is called the Connolly Amendment
which reserves to the United States the
sole determination as to what is a
domestic matter, which means that the
United States alone decides whether it
should submit to the jurisdiction of that
Court. This again is a form of veto not
unlike that which we enjoy in the
Security Council. This formula has
proved so attractive to the rest of the
world that where it has not been literally adopted elsewhere it has been extended by the Court through reciprocity. The result is that, with but two
exceptions at this moment, there are no
cases before the Court.
"Well," YOll may say, "how about
other areas? How about the European
Economic Community and its International Court?" Again the same conclusion probably obtains. The cases are still
not convincing that the Court of the

European Community enjoys the right
to pronounce judgments binding on the
member states. I am prepared to admit
that in the Van Gand case some argument could be advanced to that effect.
But, by and large, this is not the case.
Much has been made of the European
Court of Human Rights and the right of
an individual to bring. there a complaint
against one's own government for violation of human rights. However, article
25 of the Treaty establishing that Court
requires the advance consent of the
state to get a case there.
What about other areas? Let me just
mention one other point, and with this I
return to the United Nations. One of the
most fundamental articles, if not the
most fundamental article of the Charter,
is article 51-self-defense. And as you
know, in national law (we international
lawyers frequently call it municipal law)
self-defense is a privilege reserved clearly
in its first stage to the personal and
subjective assessment by the individual
that his life is imminently threatened.
True, the courts may ultimately, in a
second stage, decide that there was no
legitimate basis for sensing such a threat.
However, in the case of states and selfdefense under article 51 of the Charter
there is, practically speaking, no such
second stage. Just as with the individual,
the state, according to article 51, clearly
has the initial determination as to
whether or not it may act in self-defense.
And where is the second stage, that of
adjudication? Adjudication is made, not
by the International Court of Justice, but
by the Security Council. The right of
self-defense as determined by the individual state under article 51 remains in force
until the Security Council takes a decision one way or the other. Yet, once
again the veto comes into play. The five
great powers will invariably exercise the
veto privilege either in their own behalf
or that of their clients, and so a decision
will never be taken on this point, and the
original unilateral determination will remain in force.
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Aside from custom, what about
specific international legislatior. in the
form of multilateral treaties? Let me,
for lack of time, dredge up multilateral
conventions in maritime matters such as
the North Sea Fisheries, the North
Atlantic Fisheries, the Northwest Pacific
Fisheries, the Safety of Life at Sea,
Rules of the Road, and the Pollution
Conventions. What happens here? In
every case the execution and administration are reserved, not for international
organizations, but for the states themselves. Thus, in the face of sovereign
states we are confronted in ultimate
analysis with a world arena rather than a
world community.
What I am trying to say up to this
point is that we still have to deal
essentially with an adversative system of
autonomous states, and with such a
scenario it is hard to talk about an
international community except in respect of the slow accretion of custom
which, by and large, is more concerned
with generalities than with hard precision. It is easier to talk about an
international arena.
In this situation, what can we conclude? Well, before we decide anything I
would suggest that we ask ourselves why
we have a situation of this sort. Partly it
is, of course, an inheritance from the
past when there were few international
organizations. I do not deny that imp ortan t international organizations
exist, but what I am suggesting is that
from the point of view of international
law they remain peripheral to state
enforcement. I say this despite the fact
that, as undoubtedly many of you, I
have myself spent many years at the
United Nations.
There are, however, two more fundamental explanations of the situation
linked to the nuclear era in which we
are living. The first is a situation so
familiar to all of you that I need not
belabor it-namely, that the great world
powers are locked in a nuclear stalemate. Now a nuclear stalemate means

that from the point of view of organizing an international community, of
organizing security, we are not prepared, we are psychologically as well as
militarily unprepared, to commit our
very existence to a legal obligation. As
former Secretary of State Acheson has
observed, "The survival of states is not a
matter of law." Now, if this is the case,
is it not difficult to move into an era of
effective, indeed, even legally valid
alliances? I would suggest that it is, and
if we do not have alliances, how again
can we talk of an international community? Talk of arena? Yes.
Let me illustrate this briefly, first by
the Vietnam situation. Here we-that is
to say, sometimes the Government,
sometimes the press, sometimes public
groups-have frequently said, "We are in
Vietnam in execution of our SEATO
obligations. "I suggest that we are not in
Vietnam in execution of our SEATO
obligations. I referred a moment ago to
article 51, the gut article of the Charter,
I would propose that we are in Vietnam
on other grounds including that of
collective self-defense. However that
may be, let us look at the essential
article of SEATO, which is article 4.
Article 4 says this: "Each party recognizes that aggression by means of an
armed attack in the treaty area ...
would endanger its own peace and
safety, and agrees that it will in that
event act to meet the common danger in
accordance with its constitutional
processes." Is that an obligation? Most
certainly it is not! Again, in the world
arena of adversative states we have
carefully reserved to ourselves freedom
of ultimate unilateral decision. This
language exposes the nuclear stalemate.
This is not an alliance, it is a declaration
of independence.
Let me mention another aspect of
the same problem. In the days of the
League, enormous importance was
attached to the concept of collective
security which is the automatic obligation to apply force upon a call for the
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same by the collective organization.
This was the contribution of the League
of Nations to world peace. From my
experience at the United Nations, dating
from the San Francisco Conference
itself, I can testify as well to the
frequency with which this concept was
discussed in the first decade of the
United Nations. But today, gentlemen,
do we hear about collective security? I
would suggest we do not. It was none
other t1lan Adlai Stevenson, our distinguished Representative for so many
years at the United Nations, who, a few
months before his death, said this: "The
truth is tIlat the best hope for peace
with justice does not lie in the United
Nations. Indeed the truth is almost
exactly the reverse...• Until the international community"-you can see he
let me down-"is ready to rescue the
victims, there is no alternative to national power. "
So far I have been speaking of the
nuclear stalemate of the great world
powers. This is the first of the two more
deeply fundamental reasons why we are
living in a world arena rather tIlan a
world community. Let me now turn to
the second cause, and at this point I am
talking about the mid de-sized and the
small states. Here we encounter another
phenomenon of the nuclear era, a development which, for lack of a better way
of tagging it, I choose to call "the
inversion of power." Now, what do I
mean? I mean simply what the Prime
Minister of the United Kingdom remarked several years ago, namely, that
the nuclear stalemate between the great
powers implies added freedom of action
on the part of the middle-ranking and
small states. Because of the reluctance
of the great powers to intervene, the
smaller states have obtained an impunity for their actions that had not
previously been possible. This has
greatly increased the proliferation of
aggressions and conflicts among the
small and particularly the developing
states of the world. I would suggest that

if we look at the world scene this
conclusion rather authoritatively imposes itself. How about 1956 and the
Suez crisis? How about the Suez crisis
of today? How, indeed, about the Vietnam conflict? Does not this conflict
constitute an illustration of botll the
nuclear stalemate and the inversion of
power?
There is another area in which I
would suggest that tIlis inversion of
power is manifested. The 19th century
saw the progressive disappearance of
independent states; for example, the
Kingdoms of Burma and Madagascar
were both conquered and disappeared as
independent states. Today they have
reappeared on the world scene. I do not
suggest that the inversion of power is
solely responsible for this reappearance,
but I do submit that it has made it far
easier for the renascent and newly
emerged states to maintain their independence and freedom of maneuver.
This independence is accompanied by a
great sensitivity to all that concerns
sovereignty and freedom of choice. So
we have, on the one hand, the great
powers of the world locked in nuclear
stalemate and the middle and small
states, thanks to inversion of power,
profiting from a freedom of action that
previously had not been available. The
combined effect of the nuclear stalemate and the inversion of power has
been to prevent tile nuclear powers
from ignoring the small states and to
afford the latter freedom of maneuver
far beyond the limits of their actual
physical power. Thus tile world becomes an arena rather than a community, an arena crowded with giant,
middle-sized, and dwarf states, all competitive if not combative, with international organizations playing largely the
role of mostly disapproving spectators.
At the same time we cannot ignore
the almost stupendous disparity between the real physical strengths of the
nuclear giants and those of the reemerged and emerging states. There is,
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in consequence, a deep-seated and allpervasive cleavage of interests and
claims as between the great and the
small states-a dichotomy to which it
will be necessary to return ..
So much, then, for the first part of
my remarks-it is the world arena of
competitive and combative states rather
than a world community that constitutes one of the ultimate fundamentals
of our problem.
I now come to the term "international law." How can we confidently
assert that in such a world arena intern ationallaw could play any role?
We are, of course, faced with the
initial question as to what is law. Saint
Augustine is alleged to have said that if
he were asked what "time" is he would
reply, "Yes, I know perfectly well what
'time' is, but I can't tell you what it is."
Do we not have this question with law?
What, then, is law?
There are many criteria one might
try to apply. Let me briefly suggest
some of them. Many say that it is the
command of the sovereign, and since
international law can reveal no such
sovereign command, it is not law. Well,
this does not help us in the final
analysis. In terms of our national law,
we arrive ultimately at the Constitution.
It is the sovereign, whether a king or the
people, that grants the Constitution,
and what is the Constitution? It is
essentially a series of restrictions on the
freedom of that sovereign. How, then,
can the sovereign command a limitation
upon himself? Yet that is exactly what
we-the people who are the sovereign in
the United States-are doing with the
first 10, the 14th, and other amendments to the Constitution, are we not?
So I do not think that the concept of
command is extremely helpful to us in
proving that international law is not
law.
Now, it is said that since international law has neither legislature nor the
threat of compulsory recourse to courts
that characterize national law, it cannot

be considered law. I am going to pass
over the question of legislature. I do so,
in part, because the answer is here more
or less apparent, and, secondly, because
I do think that democratic processes or
participation in law-making is largely
irrelevant as a criterion of any law, be it
national or international.
Let us turn then to the judiciary. I
suppose if we come back to the fundamentals the requirement of resort to
courts is not helpful to us in determining whether or not legal norms are
involved. Professor Chayes reminds us
of the situation that arose in the closing
months of the Eisenhower Administration. You will perhaps recall that Congress at that time called upon the White
House to deliver over certain highly
secret documents, and the President
refused to transfer those documents.
Could Congress have cited President
Eisenhower before the Supreme or any
other Court? There is no remedy between the branches of the Government
for accomplishing any thing of the sort.
One branch may not sue another branch.
We come now to what I'm sure
you're all thinking of-sanctions. Law is
an order backed by the threat of force,
and if international law has no sanction
it is not law. Well, l am going to suggest
that international law does have sanctions, and indeed a very important
sanction which ties in directly with this
concept that I have been laying before
you-the adversative autonomy of
states. But more of this later. First, let
us look at sanction as a threat of force.
It is by no means certain that such a
sanction is a criteria of law. All of you
gentlemen belong to a highly sophisticated and integrated community-the
military community. Now I would ask
you: How many of you respect military
law because of the threat of force? I
would suggest you obey it because of
your respect for authority within the
community and of your demand that
your own authority be respected by
those subordinate to you. Moreover, a
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great deal of our own municipal law,
our national law, is irrelevant in terms
of any sanction. Much of our law,
perhaps most of it, is concerned with
determining privileges and procedures.
For example, to what extent would you
say that sanction is important to Medicare legislation? I would think only to a
very minor degree. Viewed in terms of
actual application of sanctions, international law fares no worse than do other
branches of the law. Are we today in
position to declare that the pandemic of
violence in the urban centers of the
United States, as indeed abroad, and as
evidenced by the President's recent
appeal to abandon and disorder,
signifies that national state, and municipal law do not exist?
Finally, it is said that international
law is not law because so much of it is
dominated by politics. Yet, would you
be prepared to assert that the laws
enacted by our Congressmen and
Senators are not transcendently dominated by politics? Could one assert that
military science and doctrine are unimportant in the war in Vietnam because political considerations play no
small role in decisions as to strategy,
tactics, and deployments including
bombing?
If we may then take it that intern ationallaw can and should be considered
as fulfilling the requirements and criteria of law, the next question is: "Why,
in this world arena of adversary states,
should we use law at all instead of force
and threats of force? Are not the latter
far more effective and therefore more
economical than efforts to apply rules
of law? Why should we not shoot our
way through problems?" Is not this
logical?
Well here, gentlemen, I must confess
tl13t I would like to introduce another
model. I have talked about the world
arena rather than a world community. A
second model, for my part, is what
Wohlstetter and others have called the
"Great World" concept, as distinguished

from that of the "Small World." Some
of you may remember that a decade ago
there was a great deal of talk of the
small world. Sophistication of transportation and communications had shrunk
the world. I would suggest, on the
contrary, that these capabilities and this
array of resources and equipment have,
within the context of application of
military strength and other measures of
force, had the effect of expanding
rather than reducing the apparent
world. Far be it from me, a civilian, to
suggest to you, technicians and professionals, that distance is unimportant
today in solving problems of missile
firing or logistics. If so, why is it that
orbiting satellites and hundreds of military and scientific personnel are constantly engaged in the excruciatingly
precise computations required for refining down in the last foot the exact
distances that separate missile launching
sites from possible targets? With regard
to logistics, possibly 20 years ago we
might not have been able to meet the
logistic challenges of a Vietnam operation which still remain of herculean
proportions and of staggering costs. So,
even today it is not always feasible to
shoot our way through. There are also
the political considerations. Reflect, for
example, on the Congo airdrops of 1963
and 1967. Can we say that these were
useful or highly effective operations?
I was in the Middle East in 1956 at
the time of the first Suez crisis and
recall that those elements of the Egyptian population that were the most
articulate in their opposition to the
French and British landings were not
the Egyptians, but precisely the French
and the British residents. They knew
perfectly well what they were faced
with. No matter how swiftly their own
national forces moved, they could not
arrive in time to protect them or their
properties.
Given this great world model, we
cannot go around shooting our way
through problems. Even a gangster state
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has at some point to establish rules if
only to economize the costs of the
shooting it would otherwise have to
resort to. At some stage the virtues of
predictability and orderliness become
imperative. We have to have our Status
of Armed Forces Agreements, otherwise
overseas operations would be out of the
question. We have to go on the basis
that we must know, for example, when
you are sent abroad that you are not
going to be subjected by a foreign
government to an income tax every time
you set foot on its soil. We have to have
some rules established on a basis of
reasonable expectations-the expectations that states can obtain, regularly,
recognition from others of their claims
under international law. Such claims as
do receive recognition are called rights.
There is also the counterpart, namely,
an acknowledgment by other states that
if such rights are denied the injured
state may take action to enforce them.
So, in effect, we are saying that
international law is like national law.
You go to your lawyer to find out what
you can claim-indeed get away withand what you cannot claim, and what
will be the consequences, often totally
unperceived by the layman, of pressing
legal or illegal claims. Thus international
law, as all law, is concerned with ascertaining and demonstrating in the light of
practice those claims which can be
pressed as rights without violating
expectations established in the international arena and those which could be
pressed only against the expectations of
adversary states. Where a threat or an
attempt is made in the international
arena to deny a right, a secondary right
arises for the injured state to undertake
the enforcement of the primary right.
This we did during the recent threat to
freedom of navigation in the Red Sea by
sending a eVA through after the generation of the threat.
Thus international law, the law of
this world arena of adversary states, like
all law has its sanctions, sanctions at

times more efficacious than those
enjoyed by national law. What is more,
in this arena of relentless struggle, just
as within the state itself, law is a
condition of continued survival and a
system for reconciling sharply competitive claims.
I thus arrive at the core of the topic
for this morning. If international law
concerns the determination of those
claims which, on the basis of expectations in the international arena, have
become enforceable rights and those
claims which, because of failure to
propagate effective expectations, cannot
yet be enforced as rights, then the
ultimate question must be: What are the
fundamental claims and rights which
international law enforces in the world
arena?
Now claims are meaningless unless
attached to interests of which they
constitute the authoritative representation. But where claims have received
recognition by generating expectations
in the international arena, it must be
that reciprocity of interests have produced these expectations. Reciprocity,
therefore, lies at the base of sanctions
and state enforcement of international
law. In consequence, our problem becomes, in turn, that of identifying the
reciprocal interests generating expectations as to claims.
It is at this point that I return to the
first portion of my remarks where I
stressed the deep-seated and allpervasive dichotomy of claims and interests as between the great and the
small states. At the same time we must
remain aware of the inversion of power
which effectively prevents the great
powers from dismissing the interests and
claims of the small states. The vast
strength of the great powers alone
suffices to propagate throughout the
world arena expectations and recognition of their claims. On the other hand,
inversion of power provides fertile soil
for the growth of expectations among
great and small alike and recognition in
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the world arena of the claims of the
small states.
It is obvious that the interests and
claims which, for convenience, we may
call the objectives of the great and of
the small states in this vast dichotomy
must be divergent. Yet, because of the
inversion of power, divergence of objectives must be accepted in this world
arcna.
What, then, are the respective objectivcs of the great and the small states?
There are those who assert that
objectives of all states constitute a vast
spectrum running from "power,"
"wealth," "enlightenment," and
"hcalth," to "human dignity," "rectitude," and "affection," whatever these
terms could mean. Others talk of the
"protective principle," "passive personality," etc. However again, I think it
important that we persist in getting
down to ultimates within the context of
this vast dichotomy. I would suggest, on
the one hand, the interests and claims of
the great powers proceed from an objective or goal which is that of freedom of
communications. These are interests and
claims which, by and large, are mutually
shared among them, which have propagated expectations in the international
arena even on the part of the small
states and which have, therefore, become rights under international law. On
the other hand, the interest and claims
of the small states proceed from an
opposed objective or goal which is that
of national security. These interests and
claims and this objective are, by and
large, mutually shared among the small
states and through the inversion of
power have received recognition in the
international arena even on the part of
the great powers. Indeed, the great
powers themselves share this objective
to a lesser degree. These interests,
claims, and objectives have likewise become rights under international law.
We are, therefore, faced in international law, as in national law, with a
dichotomy or polarity as between the

objectives of the great and the small
states. Professor McDougal has lucidly
pointed to this pervasive polarity to
which he assigns the term "complementarity," and which he illustrates by
the polarity or complementarity in our
own constitutional law between Federal
and State rights. The rights of the
Federal and the State Governments,
although basically opposed, are, nevertheless, both accepted in the national
arena of competing rights and are,
hence, complementary. In fact, they
overlap to a degree. We have the same
type of problem in the international
arena, and, in fact, there is, as in
national law, a shared complementarity.
Let me start first with the middlesized and small states and their concern
with national security. They have few
nationals abroad. They have few ships
flying their flags on the high seas or in
foreign ports. They have fewer national
airlines operating abroad. Far from
seeking additional air traffic rights
abroad, they are primarily concerned
with restricting the demands of foreign
carriers to operate into and out of their
national territories. Freedom of travel
and communication is not their principal preoccupation.
Given their limited resources, their
concern is largely with preserving their
own territorial integrity, particularly
those states which have just entered the
world arena. And so to translate this
phrase "national security" into another
term more conveniently manageable by
us throughout the course, we can talk
about the objective (which includes the
interests and claims) of "territorial jurisdiction." National security, in effect,
can in most cases be squared to territorial jurisdiction. We will see that the
states that do make such claims are
largely concerned with three things:
territorial integrity, including sanctity
of frontiers; exclusive jurisdiction over
all foreign nationals and interests on
their territories; and political independence. In essence this means that the
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objectives of national security cause
these states to stress repeatedly the
concept of "nonintervention." They do
not care too much about what happens
abroad. Having few nationals, ships,
airlines, and other interests overseas,
they are inevitably less upset with what
happens to them than are the great
powers who, on the contrary, have,
relatively speaking, many nationals and
interests subject to and hostages of the
territorial jurisdiction of the small
states.
We see this concern with territorial
jurisdiction reflected in many ways. The
states newly emerged from colonial
empires accept without protest inequitable and unrealistic frontiers inherited
from the colonial era lest they impair
their own territorial integrity by seeming to redefine them. All the emerging
states have come out for the principle of
self-determination at the United Nations
in terms of the achievement of independence. But once they have obtained
their independence, they are quite as
resolutely opposed to that same principle. They protest that it flies in the face
of their own territorial integrity. Look
at the declared position of the newly
emerged African states, Congo and
Nigeria in particular, and of the Organization of African Unity when confronted by secession movements based
on local internal self-determination.
Territorial jurisdiction finds perhaps
its most striking manifestation when
applied to the territorial or marginal
seas. By and large, an inverse ratio is
involved. The smaller the navy of a
state, the smaller its merchant marine,
the wider its territorial water claims-in
some cases in excess of 200 miles. This
claim of territorial jurisdiction runs
counter to the objective of the great
powers which is freedom of communications, including freedom of navigation.
As I will have occasion later to point
out, the 3-mile limit is not an obsolete
concept despite its venerable origins-far
from it. Quite obviously, extension of

territorial waters can only be at the
expense of freedom of navigation, particularly in those nearly 200 critical
areas of the world constituted by international straits. Were the 3-mile limit
doubled to 6 miles, over three-fourths
of those straits would become territorial
waters, and were that distance, in turn,
doubled to 12 miles, as is the claims of
many states today including the Soviet
Union, all of the international straits
would become territorial waters. The
recent Vilkitski Straits incident involving two U.S. icebreakers demonstrates a
dimension of the problem. In this situation the only right under international
law left to protect the objective of
freedom of communication is that of
innocent passage, and yet innocent
passage is itself subject to the objectives
of national security and territorial jurisdiction. Article 14 of the Geneva Convention of 1958 on Territorial Waters
declares that passage is not innocent if it
is prejudicial to the security of the
coastal state. This is, of course, an
illustration of the objective of national
security and the principle of territorial
jursdiction.
But let us not delude ourselves. In
certain respects, to the extent that they
too have their areas of vulnerability,
even the great powers are concerned
with territorial jurisdiction. For example, the Soviet Union, whose navy
and merchant marine have only in recent years attained considerable proportions and which, outside the satellite
states, has few nationals or interests
abroad, has long espoused the territorial
jurisdiction approach, including a claim
for wide territorial waters. Specifically,
Khrushchev, in the famous 31 December 1960 speech, and Kosygin, in his 19
June address of this year at the United
Nations, came out for territorial integrity and sacredness of frontiers with
specific application to the frontiers of
East Germany and the satellite countries. Kosygin is also concerned at defending the immutability of the
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frontiers with China established under
the Tsarist Regime.
And the United States. We have also
areas of vulnerability where we invoke
territorial jurisdiction-for example,
Berlin. We cannot conceivably resort to
a nuclear exchange with the Soviets over
Berlin. Consequently, we have anchored
our position on territorial jurisdictionspecifically our territorial rights as an
occupying powcr. Had we not had this
legal argument available to us, we would
have been subjected to even further
applications of the "salami" tactics
which have plagued our position with
rcgard to access to Berlin. International
law has been our shield in a scenario of
nuclear stalemate.
But the United States also in other
areas finds itself vulnerable. For example: our fishing industry is far from
bcing dominant in the world today. The
result is that although we come out
fully for the freedom of the seas and the
narrowest possible territorial waters, we
enacted, in November of last year,
legislation extending to 12 miles the
bclt of waters reserved exclusively for
U.S. fishing interests.
I now turn to the objectives, claims,
and interests of the great powers.
The concept of territorial jurisdiction
favored by the small states has been
under increasing attack in recent years
by those great powers who tend to favor
the competing form of jurisdiction
based on the objective of freedom of
communication and which we can translate into the term "nationality jurisdiction." J urisdietion based on nationality
reflects the claims, interests, and objectives of those great powers which have
many nationals abroad, many naval
forces on the high seas, many merchant
ships under their flags, many airlines
and aircraft operating abroad under
their jurisdiction, responsibility, and
protection, as well as many investments
abroad. To meet such responsibilities
abroad, a continuing link of nationality
is indispensable. These great powers

extol less than do the small states the
virtues of nonintervention and are more
interested in protecting, under a jurisdiction based on nationality, the free
movement of their nationals, ships, aircraft, and investments.
Let me offer you, first, an extreme
example of this type of jurisdiction. It
would seem normal that an American
could go to Italy and conclude a contract with the Italian Government granting him exclusive rights in Italy for the
marketing of American farm equipment.
Yet, such is not the case. The U.S.
Government would reach out through
the arm of nationality to declare that
the American, even abroad, would be
violating our antitrust legislation and
would be liable to criminal prosecution
and penalties in the States.
This concern with the objective of
freedom of communications and jurisdiction based on nationality finds its
clearest expression in respect of
freedom of navigation on the high seas.
We demand the right to move throughout the world with the narrowest possible restrictions on freedom of the seas.
Indeed, we even claim that freedom of
communications is a form of national
security for us. We find it advantageous
that our surface vessels and our aircraft
should be able to move for surveillance
and other purposes, including national
defense, up to the 3-mile limit rather
than be held off at the 12-mile limit off
the shores of other states as the RB-47
incident in the White Sea of a decade
ago illustrated.
The United States is not alone in
stressing freedom of communications
and nationality jurisdiction. Of course a
state like Japan, with its large fishing
fleet and merchant marine, by and large,
follows the same general approach to
problems of international law. I would
suggest, finally, on this point, that the
Soviets with the growth in their seapower and merchant marine might
possibly be evolving gradually from terri torial jurisdiction based on the
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objective of national security to nationality jurisdiction based on the objective of freedom of communications.
Perhaps the word "communications"
might eventually come to take on the
additional meanings that strategists such
as Professors Kissinger and Schelling
impute to it within the context of
communications between nuclear antagonists.
So this is the clash between the two
forms of jurisdiction-the one pursued
by the small states and based on territory, the other the objective of the great
powers, namely, freedom of communication and based on nationality.
I wish, in the closing minutes of this
introduction to international law, to
illustrate this confrontation between
and the complementarity of rights of
the great and the small states under
international law by turning to the
current crisis in the Middle East.
You may remember that in 1957,
after the 1956 crisis, the United Nations
established two UNEF posts in U.A.R.
territory at Sharm of Sheikh and at Ras
Nasrani on the Sinai Peninsula near the
Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba
at a distance of more than 90 miles
from the frontier between the U.A.R.
and Israel. The purpose was to dissuade
the U.A.R. from reinstituting its blockade of the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf
of Aqaba and to reaffirm the principles
of freedom of the seas and of innocent
passage. By so doing, the United Nations was demonstrating the importance
which it attached to assuring freedom of
communications and freedom of passage
through the Straits of Tiran and the
Gulf of Aqaba. The removal of these
two U.N. posts at Nasser's insistence in
May of this year constituted, therefore,
an immediate and direct threat to the
very principle of freedom of communications which had led to their establishment a decade ago. Accordingly, on the
26th of May, U-Thant delivered a
memorandum to President Nasser pointing out that this demand would have the

most destructive effect possible on
peace in the Middle East.
Three days before that, President
Johnson had made a statement on the
same point, declaring the right of free
innocent passage on the international
waterways is a vital interest of the
international community. (I see that
others prefer the term "world com. " to "wor
l d arena. ') Th ere
mumty
emerged, in consequence, a confrontation between the demands of the
U.A.R. for national security and those
of the United States for freedom of
navigation. The passage through the
Straits was clearly within U.A.R. territorial waters since the only navigable
channel, that between the Sinai Peninsula and the Island of Tiran, is but
I-mile wide. The sole exception to
territorial jurisdiction here would be
under the international law privilege of
innocent passage. On this point the
U.A.R. argued, among other things, that
the passage of vessels through the Straits
would, under article 14 of the Geneva
Convention that I have mentioned, be
prejudicial to the security of the coastal
state.
The problem was raised before the
Security Council, and after a preliminary period of sparring, the debate
was initiated by none other than the
U.A.R. Representative who delivered a
searching legal analysis of the problem.
This speech has been somewhat played
down by the American press, fascinated
and awed as it has been by the rhetoric
and logic of the Israeli Foreign Minister,
Abba Eban. But the entire address,
many pages long, was a juridical analysis
which, in turn, launched a juridical
dispute that lasted for days.
It is true that this protracted dispute
concerned freedom of navigation
through straits through which passed
only 7 percent of Israel's seaborne
commerce. However, by the admissions
of both sides, deeper issues and precedents of international law were involved-the confrontations between the
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two legitimate objectives of national
security, which U-Thant conceded to
the U.A.R., and of freedom of communications. These issues could not be
avoided. The United States was concerned lest a flagging in the resolve to
dcfend the latter might comport serious
precedents for other more important
international straits. For example, just
as the U.A.R. claims that the Gulf of
Aqaba is an historic bay which can be
closed to all but the coastal powers
(from which it excludes Israel), so the
Soviet Union argues that the Baltic
should be considered a closed sea to
which access can be had only through
the mile-wide Straits of Skagerrak. Even
without that claim the Soviet Union
could bring pressure to bear in Denmark
and Sweden to deny innocent passage
on the grounds that such passage could
be prejudicial to the security of the
Soviet Union which, in turn, could
cause them misgivings as to their own
national security.
Following the outbreak of hostilities
and the stalemate in the Security Council, the problem was handed over to the
General Assembly. This time most of
the debates turned on the highly legalistic claim of belligerency advanced by
the U.A.R. which declared that since
1947 it had remained at war with Israel.
The purpose of the claim was to justify
the blockade of the Straits and the Gulf
and to disclaim responsibility for any
new aggression by such a blockade since
the U.A.R. and Israel had, since 1947,
been at war. It was even argued that the
United States, which had "blockaded"
Cuba in 1962 without claiming belligerency, was scarcely in a position to
object to a blockade imposed by a state
such as the U.A.R. which had been
frank in invoking its rights under international law as a belligerent Thus, in
the Security Council the line of battle
was drawn between the rules of international law relating to territorial integrity
and those concerning freedom of the
seas. In the General Assembly the ulti-

mate issue was whether or not freedom
of the seas was to be restricted by the
rights of a belligerent under international law. As you may recall, that body
failed to reach a solution precisely
because of the demands of the Arab
State to retain the rights of belligerents
and the insistence of the Western World
upon their rights under international
law for freedom of the seas.
Now in this situation some of you
may say, "Well, does not this all prove
that international law is doing us a
disservice in such a situation? Far from
providing it has stultified a solution of
the problem. "
In response, I would remark, first,
that you are possibly attributing a more
decisive role to international law in that
situation than do the lawyers themselves. It is doubtful that international
law could claim so crucial an influence
in frustrating a settlement, if, indeed,
that was its objective. However, the fact
that the vocabulary and the discussion
of issues of international law clearly
dominated all the debates at both the
Security Council and the General
Assembly validates two conclusions.
One is the importance of becoming
familiar with the sophisticated dialogue
and terminology of international law, if
one is to gain a comprehension of the
critical events and movements on the
world scene today. The other conclusion is that preoccupation with the legal
issues demonstrated that international
law is deeply concerned with the ultimate problems of our time, whereas, the
proliferation of political issues-and
there were many of them transpiercing
this crisis-in the end tend to cancel
each other out. Concerned as it is with
the two equally valid objectives of
national security and freedom of communications, international law can, in
the end, offer a valid and sophisticated
balance between competing national interests, claims, and objectives, not only
in terms of the struggle between Israel
and the Arab States, hut also in its
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implications for other areas of the
world.
These, gentlemen, are some of the
problems that in the course of the
coming lectures we will be examining

and pondering. It is my hope that you
may come away from them with a
sharper and, I would venture to suggest,
deeper insight into some of the issues
that are troubling our times.
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